I’ve read a couple of interesting books recently, one was “The End of Science” by John Horgan, and the other was “Radical Embodied Cognitive Science” by Anthony Chemero. Horgan’s theme was the question of whether the fundamentals of science are now so solid that before long nothing genuinely “new” will be left to find, and science will be reduced to either obsolescence, or puzzle-solving type application of existing theories to particular problems. The only other type of science that still exists, according to Horgan, is “ironic” science. A kind of semi-postmodern project to explain or describe what we already know in more “beautiful” or appealing forms, but which never produces hypotheses that are empirically testable, and for this reason, don’t actually advance knowledge. Horgan is distinctly dismissive of this kind of science, as being not “proper” science (he deliberately compares it to postmodern literary criticism, which he seems to have particular contempt for, having once been a student of it himself). Chemero would be, I’m sure, classified by Horgan as an ironic scientist. I don’t think Chemero would be able to deny that in a sense, his philosophy is empirically untestable, but he certainly argues that it is pragmatic in the sense of being useful to scientists engaged in solving real world problems.
This is a post about the “Projected Mind Fallacy”, as named by Edwin Jaynes. Roughly, the projected mind fallacy is the mistaking of uncertainty about the world for a property of the world itself. In other words, thinking that God plays dice. Unfortunately though, it’s not as simple as this and I feel that it’s interpretation deserves some discussion. It is not obvious exactly what should count ‘the world itself’/the non dice playing God/reality, the rest of this post is about how I think this question should be answered (and some other stuff).
Mind projection fallacies can often be spotted by their absurdity: If I had a bag of snooker balls it would be ridiculous to think that the balls exist in some kind of mixture of colours until I pick them out an look at them. Surely the balls are objectively some colour whether or not I decide to look at them. It is (if one accepts the mind projection fallacy) fallacious to say that that the balls that have an indeterminant colour, when in fact, it is just me who doesn’t know which one I will pick out. It is often stated as the confusion of ontology with epistemology, but these words don’t really help anyone understand it.